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Adaptation to different types of cognitive 
confl ict. Are there common mechanisms?
Abstract: One of the functions of cognitive control is to detect diffi  culties in information pro-
cessing and adjust the level of performance. Th is article presents study on confl ict adaptation in 
which we investigated how detection of cognitive confl ict infl uences behaviour on a subsequent 
trial. In two experiments we aimed to fi nd out whether the adjustment can be carried out across 
two kinds of cognitive confl icts: between competing responses and requirements of two tasks. 
Th e modifi ed version of the fl anker task in switching paradigm was used so that participants 
had to switch between two tasks that shared the same stimulus set. Th e results showed that the 
two kinds of confl icts did not interact with each other. Furthermore, each confl ict evoked con-
fl ict adaptation, but this adaptation did not occurred across confl icts. Th is suggests that confl ict 
adaptation covers a set of mechanisms functioning uniquely in one domain.
Key words: cognitive control, confl ict monitoring, confl ict adaptation, task-switching, fl anker 
task
Introduction
Cognitive control is the ability of human cognitive system to monitor lower-level 
information processing and to modify it according to its internal goals [Chuderski, 
Nęcka 2010]. One of its main functions is to detect and deal with occurring errors 
and difficulties. For example, it has been shown that when a person makes a mistake 
in a speeded reaction time task, in the next trial he or she reacts slower and makes 
fewer errors, probably adjusting the tempo to maintain required level of accuracy 
[Veen, Carter,2006]. More cautious mode of information processing is also imple-
mented when task becomes more difficult [Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, Cohen 
2001; Gratton, Coles, Donchin 1992].
In the presented study we investigated whether detecting difficulties has global or 
local consequences, that is whether cognitive conflict leads to general change in pro-
cessing strategy or whether it only affect processes related to the specific task or goal. 
Cognitive conflict results from interference between task relevant and task irrelevant 
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information or between desired and automatic reaction [Egner, Delano, Hirsh 2007]. 
There are several tasks that are used to induce cognitive conflict in laboratory. Partici-
pants are usually required to respond to one of the stimulus features while ignoring 
others, e.g. in a Stroop task they are asked to name the colour of the font in which 
the word is written, without reading the actual word. In a compatible stimuli condi-
tion response to both features are the same (word “red” written with red ink) and in 
an incompatible condition they differ (word “red” written with green ink). Partici-
pants are typically faster and more accurate when responding to compatible stimuli. 
The common way of explaining this phenomenon is a dual-route model according 
to which compatible trials are faster because both features of stimuli lead to the acti-
vation of the same (correct) response. In incompatible trials the activation of both 
contradicting responses results in a conflict and conflict resolution is time consuming 
[De Jong, Liang, Lauber 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, Osman 1990; Zhang, Zhang, 
Kornblum 1999; Zorzi Umiltà 1995].
There are at least three main types of conflict described in the literature. In stim-
ulus-based conflict there is incompatibility between task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
stimulus features [e.g. Stroop task, Egner, Delano, Hirsch 2007]. Response conflict 
occurs when different stimulus features involve different motor reactions. In this case 
subject has to choose the most adequate response from a variety of simultaneously 
possible opportunities [e.g. Simon task, Egner et al. 2007; Simon 1969; Wuhr, Kunde 
2008]. Task conflict stems from incongruence between requirements of different tasks, 
for instance subjects switch between two tasks and each of them requires different 
response to the same stimuli [Monsell, Taylor, Murphy 2001; Steinhauser, Hübner 
2009].
Studies show that cognitive processing can be adjusted after the occurrence of 
conflict had been detected. The difference between reaction times to compatible and 
incompatible stimuli is usually smaller after the incompatible trial than after com-
patible one. This phenomenon is known as Gratton effect or sequential modulation 
[Gratton et al. 1992; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger Carter 2004; Notebaert, 
Soetens, Melis 2001; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, Sommer 2002]. One of 
the most popular explanations of this effect has been proposed by conflict monitor-
ing theory [Botvinick et al. 2001]. According to this model there are two modules 
involved in dealing with conflict: conflict monitoring module and conflict adaptation 
module. The first one, located probably in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), detects 
the occurrence of conflict and triggers attentional adjustments executed by the second 
module, located in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) [Botvinick et al. 2001; Bot-
vinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, Cohen 1999; Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, 
Cohen 1998; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, Carter 2000]. This adjustment is effectu-
ated through enhancement of processing of task-relevant information and reduction 
of the processing of task-irrelevant information.
One of the controversies in conflict adaptation literature is whether this mecha-
nism is specific to the conflict type or whether it is a globally working control system. 
In the first case, the conflict adaptation module would be sensitive to the source of 
detected conflict and adjust performance to deal with this type of conflict only. In 
the latter case, detection of conflict would lead to more controlled processing in the 
Rocznik Kognitywistyczny_8_1lam.indd   56 2015-12-15   08:59:20
57
Adaptation to different types of cognitive conflict. Are there common mechanisms?
whole cognitive system. A number of studies have shown that the adaptation pro-
cess acts locally [Akçay, Hazeltine 2008; Blais, Ribidoux, Risko, Besner 2007; Funes, 
Lupiáñez, Humphreys 2010; Jacoby, Lindsay, Hessels 2003; Kiesel, Kunde, Hoffman 
2006; Kim, Chung, Kim 2013]. For example, Kiesel et al. [2006], using a task switch-
ing procedure, demonstrated that the Graton effect appeared only when the same task 
was repeated. When tasks were alternated the conflict detected in the previous trial 
did not result in conflict adaptation in the following trial. At the same time other 
studies have shown that conflict adaptation is a rather global process [Freitas, Bahar, 
Yang, Banai 2007; Kunde, Wühr 2006]. Freitas et al. [2007] observed cross-task con-
flict adaptation when participants alternated between the Stroop task and Eriksen 
flanker task (in which participants are required to respond to the letter “flanked” by 
distractors, i.e. FFNFF).
In the current study we aimed examine whether conflict adaptation occurs 
between two types of conflict: response-based and task-based. In two experiments we 
used a modified flanker task and classical task-switching paradigm. Although number 
of studies examined stimulus-based and response-based conflicts [Akçai, Hazeltine 
2008; Egner et al. 2007; Funes et al. 2010; Notebaert, Verguts 2008] to our knowledge 
there are no data on the relationship between response-based and task-based con-
flicts. It is important to note that response and tasks conflict are conceptually separate 
while response-based conflict always involves stimulus conflict (incongruent stimuli). 
We assumed that if control process triggered by one type of conflict did not induce 
adaptation to the other type of conflict it would suggest that adjustments are sensitive 
to the conflict source. If we find conflict adaptation between different types of conflict 
it will point towards the conclusion that detecting one type of conflict triggers general 
optimization of information processing.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Thirty-five Jagiellonian University students participated in the study in return for 
course credit (13 men, mean age = 20, SD = 1.6).
A modified version of the flanker task was used [Eriksen, Eriksen 1974]. As in the 
original version, the stimulus consisted of five letters (e.g. SSHSS) and participants 
had to respond to a central one while ignoring irrelevant flankers. The stimuli set 
consisted of sixteen samples: red or green letter “H” or “S” flanked by other letters 
“H” or “S” of the same or different colour. The examples of stimuli are presented on 
Figure 1. The experiment was run on PC computers using E-prime software. The 
stimuli were presented in the centre of the scree on the white background, on LCD 
monitors (1280 x 800 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). The size of letters was about
1 x 8 cm (single spacing).








H, F, red, blue
B, S, green, grey

























Figure 1. Stimuli used in both experiments, examples presented for left button response
The task induced two types of conflict: response-based (incompatibility between 
target and flankers) and task-based (incongruence between reactions required for 
the target in the context of each task). The target and the flankers could be related 
either to the same response (compatible trial, e.g. HHHHH) or to different responses 
(incompatible trial, e.g. SSHSS). Moreover, participants had to switch unpredictably 
between two subtasks: letter and colour task. For the letter task, they were asked to 
respond to identity of the central letter (press the right button for S and the left button 
for H). In the case of the colour task, participants were instructed to respond to the 
colour of the central letter (right button if the target was green and left button if the 
target was red).
The experiments were held in a computer laboratory. Participants were informed 
that they were taking part in a study of attention. Prior to the experiment they were 
presented with instructions (stressing both, speed and accuracy) and asked to remem-
ber how to react to each stimulus. Participants started with three practice sessions
(10 trials each): the first and the second involved only one task (letter and colour, 
respectively) and the third session required switching between them. In the experi-
mental session subtasks (colour or letter) and compatibility of target changed in 
a random order. The task consisted of 1600 trials. Each trial started with 800ms cue 
indicating which subtask was coming next (word “letter” or “colour”). Then the fixa-
tion point appeared for 100 ms, followed by a letter string. Participants had 1000 
ms to react using the left or right mouse button. In the event of mistakes or a late 
response, the feedback (red screen) appeared for 200 ms. After a correct answer the 
next trial started immediately.
Results and discussion
The mean accuracy was 63.7% (M = 1019.40 correct trials, SD = 191.70). Only reac-
tion times of correct answers were included into analysis. Four-way ANOVA was 
calculated with five factors: Task Transition (Repetition/Switch), Task Congruency 
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(Congruent/Incongruent), Response Compatibility (Compatible/Incompatible), Pre-
vious Task Congruency (Previous Congruent/ Previous Incongruent), and Previous 
Response Compatibility (Previous Compatible/Previous Incompatible).
Performance was generally faster on task repetition than on task alternation trials 
(F1,34 = 4.9, p < .05, η2 = .13), on task congruent than task incongruent trials (F1,34 = 
56.8, p < .0001, η2 = .63) and on response compatible than response incompatible 
trials (F1,34 = 111.4, p < .0001, η2 = .77). Performance was also faster when previous 
trials was task incongruent (Previous Task Congruency: F1,34 = 33.44, p < .0001, η2 = 
.50) or response incompatible (Previous Response Compatibility: F1,34 = 5.83; p < .05, 
η2 = .15).
Surprisingly, we did not find the Gratton effect for response conflict (Response 
Compatibility x Previous Response Compatibility: F1,34 = 1.39, n.s.; Task Alternation 
x Response Compatibility x Previous Response Compatibility: F1,34 = 3.3, n.s.). The 
Gratton effect was present for conflict between tasks: the difference between task con-
gruent and incongruent trials was smaller when the previous trial was incongruent 
compared to the situation when the previous trial was congruent (Task Congruency
x Previous Congruency: F1,34 = 14.8, p < .0001, η2 = .30), but only if task was repeated 
(Task Transition x Task Congruency x Previous Congruency: F1,34 = 7.8, p < .05, η2 
= .19; Task Congruency Adaptation for repetition trials: F1,34 = 24, p < .0001; Task 
Congruency Adaptation for alternation trials: F1,34 = .20, n.s.).
Furthermore, we did not find the adaptation to conflict between responses after 
conflict between tasks (Response Compatibility x Previous Congruency: F1,34 = 3.8, 
n.s.; Task Transition x Response Compatibility x Previous Congruency: F1,34 = 1.40, 
n.s.). There was also no adaptation to conflict between tasks after conflict between 
responses (Task Congruency x Previous Compatibility: F1,34 < .01, n.s.; Task Transi-
tion x Task Congruency x Previous Compatibility: F1,34 = .86, n.s.).
The results of this experiment suggest that conflict adaptation works locally – it 
occurs only within the same task and does not transfer from one type of conflict to 
another. However, it is not clear why we did not find the Gratton effect for response 
conflict. We suspect that participants might have not paid enough attention to the 
task, which is supported by the overall low accuracy and post-experimental reports 
of task being experienced as boring and tiring. We try to replicate these results in 
Experiment 2, in which the task was shorter, but also more difficult.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Forty-nine Jagiellonian University students participated in the study in return for 
course credit (8 men, mean age = 19.9 SD = 1.5).
The task was the same as used in Experiment 1, but here the stimulus set was 
extended to 96 samples. This time, for each task a subject had to choose between four 
rather than two alternatives. Beside the letter “S” and “H”, letters “F” (left button) and 
“B” (right button) were used. Similarly in case of colours, not only “red” and “green”, 
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but also “blue” (left button) and “grey” (right button) were used (Figure 1). None of 
the stimulus was repeated with the same required response. The procedure consisted 
of three training session and then 1280 trials in the main task.
Results and discussion
The mean accuracy was 81.25% (M = 1040.78 correct trials, SD = 86.31). Similarly to 
the Experiment 1, only reaction times of correct answers were included into analysis.
Contrary to the results from Experiment 1, there was no general effect of task 
switching on reaction times (F1,48 = 1.6, n.s.). However, task congruent trials were 
performed faster than task incongruent trials (F1,48 = 6.03, p < .05, η2 = .24) and 
response compatible trials were performed faster than response incompatible trials 
(F1,48 = 15.02, p < .0001, η2 = .24). Performance was also faster when previous trial 
was task incongruent (Previous Task Congruency: F1,48 = 56.9, p < .0001, η2 = .54) 
or when previous trial was response incompatible (Previous Response Compatibility: 
F1,48 = 199.1, p < .0001, η2 = .81).
Figure 2. Gratton effect for conflict between responses when the task was repeated and alternated 
(Experiment 2; C – congruent stimuli in a current trial, I – incongruent stimuli in a current trial, 
C (n–1) – congruent stimuli in a previous trial, I (n–1) – incongruent stimuli in a previous trial).
Contrary to the previous study, the Gratton effect for conflict between responses 
was found: the difference between response compatible and response incompatible 
trials was smaller when the previous trial was response incompatible than compat-
ible, independently from task switching (Response Compatibility x Previous Com-
patibility: F1,48 = 9.4; p < .05, η2 = .16; Task Transition x Response Compatibility
x Previous Compatibility: F1,48 = .81, n.s). These results are presented on Figure 2.
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The Gratton effect was also present for conflict between tasks: the difference between 
task congruent and task incongruent trials was smaller when the previous trial was 
task incongruent compared to the situation when the previous trial was congruent 
(Task Congruency x Previous Congruency: F1,48 = 6.3, p < .05, η2 = .12), but only 
if task was repeated (Task Transition x Task Congruency x Previous Congruency:
F1,48 = 11.2; p < .05, η2 = .19; Task Congruency Adaptation for repetition trials:
F1,48 = 14.7, p < .0001; Task Congruency Adaptation for alternation trials: F1,48 = .35; 
n.s.). These results are shown of Figure 3.
 
Figure 3. Gratton effect for conflict between responses when the task was repeated and alternated 
(Experiment 2).
Similarly to the Experiment 1, the adaptation to conflict between responses after 
conflict between tasks did not occur (Response Compatibility x Previous Congru-
ency: F1,48 = .008; n.s; Task Transition x Response Compatibility x Previous Con-
gruency: F1,48 = 2.43, n.s.). The adaptation to conflict between tasks after conflict 
between responses depended on task switching condition (Task Congruency x Previ-
ous Compatibility: F1,48 = .60, n.s., Task Transition x Task Congruency x Previous 
Compatibility: F1,48 = 6.6, p < .01, η2 = .12). However, the effects within each con-
dition did not reach significance level (Task Congruency x Previous Compatibil-
ity for tasks alternation: F1,48 = 3.3; p = .08; Task Congruency x Previous Compatibility
for task repetition: F1,48 = 3.9; p = .06, here the pattern reversed to the Gratton effect 
was observed).
Summing up, in this experiment we found the Gratton effect for both, task and 
response conflicts, but it did not occur between two types of conflict. Similarly to the 
Experiment 1, the results suggest the occurrence of conflict adaptation only within 
the same task and conflict type.
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DISCUSSION
In the two experiments we studied the specificity of conflict adaptation mechanism. 
Participants were asked to switch between two variants of the flanker task, thus solv-
ing two kinds of conflict: between responses and between tasks. The results of the 
experiments seem to support the view that conflict adaptation process does occur 
but it is conflict-specific and task-specific. The detection of conflict did not improve 
general performance but was based on identifying the current conflict source and 
task requirement.
First of all, we found the adaptation to both types of conflicts. The response con-
flict has been already demonstrated many times, however task conflict adaptation has 
not had much support in the literature so far. While response conflict adaptation was 
independent from switching conditions, the Gratton effect for task conflict occurred 
only when the same task was repeated. Although both types of conflict are prob-
ably resolved by biasing response selection [Nieuwenhuis, Yeung 2005; Stürmer et 
al. 2002; Stürmer, Leuthold 2003], they might involve different sets of processes. For 
example, it has been suggested that in the basic flanker task visuo-spatial attention 
is required to select target among distractors [Funes et al. 2010]. Switching between 
tasks additionally involves resolving conflict between two task representations acti-
vated in working memory [Monsell 2003]. The results of the experiments presented 
in this article suggest that after detecting task conflict the adaptation system modu-
lates processing to the actual task requirements (e.g. by enhancing the processing of 
task-relevant information or inhibiting the processing of task-irrelevant information). 
This improves the performance on the next trial but only when the task is repeated. 
On the other hand, response conflict is not affected by task alternations, probably 
because responding to the central letter and ignoring the flankers is the common 
requirement for both tasks.
Although conflict adaptation was present for each type of conflict, we did not 
find adaptation between two different conflicts: detecting stimulus incompatibility 
did not affect performance on the following incongruent trial, and vice versa. The 
results also showed that response and task conflicts are of different type, since there 
was no interaction between them and they prolonged response times in an additive 
manner. This is in line with growing body of behavioural and neuroimaging data 
suggesting separate and independent mechanisms of conflict detection and resolution 
[for review see: Egner 2008] and the existence of multiply brain systems for conflict
detection [Bush, Luu, Posner 2000; Liston et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2004] and
conflict adaptation [Funes et al. 2010].
However, taking into consideration that some studies obtained the results opposite 
to ours it seems important to mention how our experiments differed from the other 
ones. First, as noted by Funes at al. [2010] differences in conflict types have been often 
confounded with differences in tasks that were used in a given study while it seems 
that only a change of conflict source limits the adaptation to the specific conflict type. 
Second, as mentioned before, most of experiments showing the effects of general 
adaptation were focused on the relationship between two response-based conflicts 
or between stimulus-based and response-based conflict that are not completely inde-
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pendent and might involve the same adaptation mechanisms [Akçai, Hazeltine 2008; 
Freitas et al. 2007; Funes et al. 2010]. At the same time the results of experiments on 
task related conflict seem to support the local control view [Kiesel et al. 2006]. Also, 
we think it is important that in our experiments participants were engaged in con-
flicts within the same set of stimulus and responses. Contrary to other experiments 
[e.g. Freitas et al. 2007; Notebaert, Verguts 2008], here the same stimuli were relevant 
for both tasks and the responses sets were overlapping causing more interference (e.g. 
green F was mapped to right button response for the letter task but to left response for 
the colour task). Certainly a deeper analysis of conflict types is needed. It is impor-
tant not only to classify conflict sources (i.e. differences between two dimensions of 
one stimuli and adjacent but separate stimuli) but also processes involved in solving 
given cognitive conflict [Funes et al. 2010]. We think that taking all these factors into 
consideration will help us to unravel the mechanisms of cognitive conflict resolution.
To sum up, the results of two experiments support the view that cognitive control 
in conflict adaptation acts locally and there is no one general mechanism optimizing 
cognitive processing. This goes against the general intuitive assumption that there is 
“central executive” [Baddeley, Hitch 1974] or “homunculus” [Logan 2003] responsi-
ble for monitoring and regulating distinct cognitive processes [for review see: Mon-
sell, Driver 2000]. The data are in line with theories stating that cognitive control 
depends on multiple executive functions that are separable, modular processes [e.g. 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, Wager 2000; Nobre 2001; Salthouse, 
Atkinson, Berish 2003]. Although the presented results do not prove that there is no 
“central controller”, it seems very probably that the control homunculus will be soon 
“dissolved”.
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